Abstract-Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we document that controlling for observable characteristics, household investors' likelihood of entering the stock market within the ensuing five years is about 20% to 30% higher if their parents or children had entered the stock market during the previous five years. By eliminating competing hypotheses such as preference similarity and herding, we argue that these findings highlight the significance of information sharing regarding household financial decisions.
I. Introduction and Related Literature
R ECENT research on household investment and portfolio choices highlights that investors often make financial decisions based on limited knowledge and incomplete information. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) show that households with less financial knowledge are less financially prepared for retirement. Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto (2010) document that financial literacy is low among the young people surveyed in the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Such limitations have substantial impact on household finance and may have effectively deterred many households from holding stocks.
A rapidly growing literature has shown that financial education and improved access to information may facilitate more efficient and welfare-enhancing investment decisions. Among others, Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003) provide evidence that information acquired from colleagues and from information fairs promoted participation in retirement plans. Bernheim and Garrett (2001) and Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2003) show that financial education also raises the participation rate in savings plans. This paper studies whether households with better access to stock investment information are more likely to own stocks. Specifically, we explore the effects of information sharing among extended family members and examine whether households are more likely to begin investing in stocks if members of their extended family were recent entrants into the stock market. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that investors whose parents or children made their first equity investment in the previous five years are on average 20% to 30% more likely to enter the stock market themselves in the next five years. Notably, our results suggest not only that children's investment is influenced by the information their parents acquired in the past, but also that parents' investment tends to be influenced by the information shared by their children. That is, older investors, who are often found to have lower stock ownership than younger investors, can be significantly influenced by their children's participation in the stock market. 1 However, perhaps somewhat surprising, we find less compelling evidence that households' stock market participation is influenced by the participation of their siblings: the point estimates are typically small and statistically imprecise. On balance, our findings suggest that investment knowledge and experience are likely to be shared among extended family members, especially between parents and children, and that such information sharing is instrumental to inducing nonparticipants to begin investing in stocks.
In principle, households have various channels through which they may acquire investment-related knowledge and information. Previous studies have emphasized the importance of learning and acquiring information through social interactions, especially through word-of-mouth communication. Most of these studies have focused on the location or community effects-communication among investors within the neighborhood where they reside. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) find that senior households that interact more with their neighbors or go to church are more likely to invest in stocks than those who are less socially active. Similarly, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) document that households living in high-social-capital areas, measured using data on electoral and blood donation participation, tend to invest more in stocks. Although statistically robust and conceptually appealing, this literature faces one major criticism: it has not established a causal relationship between social interactions and stock market participation. Indeed, an alternative hypothesis to one that attributes higher stock market participation rates to better information sharing is that people who live and interact with each other in the same neighborhood are likely to be intrinsically similar and therefore have common investment strategies in the first place. In other words, because households are not randomly assigned to communities, the stock ownership correlation revealed in these studies can be driven by a third (potentially unobservable) factor that also induces households to live in the same community.
To circumvent the concern associated with such endogenous sorting and matching, Brown, Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008; henceforth, BISW) take an instrumental variable (IV) approach. 2 Specifically, they focus on the stock 152 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ownership of investors who were born in the same community in which they live now (the native residents). The average stock ownership of this community is instrumented for by the average ownership of the birth states of residents who moved to this community from other states. BISW argue that their IV choice is valid because, first, as Guiso et al. (2004) have argued, the social capital of one's birthplace has long-lasting effects on one's future economic decisions, which will in turn affect the average stock ownership of the community to which one moves; second, "there is no reason why one's own stock market participation decision should be influenced directly by the ownership rates in these other states except through their effects on one's neighbors" (p. 1512). Applying this IV strategy to administrative tax records, BISW find that if the community-wide average equity market participation rate rises 10 percentage points, the likelihood of investing in stocks by the community's native residents increases about 4 percentage points.
II. Conceptual Framework
This paper adopts an alternative route to circumvent identification problems associated with endogenous sorting and matching. We focus on information sharing among investors who are connected for a purely exogenous reason: they belong to the same extended family. As children grow up and move out to form their own households, members who belong to the same extended family must make their own, but still potentially interrelated, financial decisions. In the remainder of this paper, family refers to extended family, which in our data set typically consists of several households. Also, for clarity, investor refers to a person whose investment decision is subject to the influence of information shared by other family members. 3 Although information sharing within a household is generally more frequent and efficient than that within a family, we do not pursue the former for three reasons. First, because investment decisions are typically made in a coordinated manner within a household, it is very difficult to identify to what extent information sharing between household members-most important, between husbands and wivesfacilitates stock investment. Second, most household survey data do not separately record investment behaviors of husbands and wives. Third, unlike families, which are tied by exogenous biological relationships, most households are formed through marriage. As similar people tend to reside in the same neighborhood, married couples are more likely to share similar preferences, which brings back the endogenous matching concerns.
Extensive studies have exploited the intergenerational relationship, the family relationship that is also the focus of this paper. Most notably, Solon (1992) studies intergenerational income mobility, while Charles and Hurst (2003) examine intergenerational wealth correlation. More recently, Charles et al. (2007) focus on intergenerational correlations of consumption, which are more closely related to households' well-being. In addition, and closely related to our paper, Chiteji and Stafford (1999) document that the likelihood of owning transaction accounts and stocks for households headed by young adults is positively influenced by their parents' ownership of such assets. Finally, BISW also detect some intergenerational correlation of stock ownership. However, because of the limitation of the tax record data they use, they achieve only some suggestive results and do not examine the sequential patterns of stock market entry.
Our analysis extends the previous studies in several dimensions. First, unlike the existing intergenerational relationship literature that squarely focuses on the transmission of knowledge and information through a one-way channel-from parents to children-we examine both the influence of parents on children and the influence of children on parents. We also study potential information sharing among siblings, which has attracted some attention recently. For example, Lusardi (2003) reports that people learn a great deal about planning for retirement from their older siblings. 4 Second, although members belong to the same family for exogenous reasons, because they are connected genetically and lived together for a long time, members can share similar preferences, which may lead to similar investment behavior. Hence, the correlation of stock ownership at any given time does not necessarily speak to information sharing. Interestingly, Charles and Hurst (2003) show that the raw parent-child correlation of stock ownership vanishes when controlling for income.
To more accurately identify the information-sharing effect, this paper examines the sequential correlations of the stock market entries and exits of different family members instead of the static contemporaneous correlation of stock ownership. This identification strategy has two advantages. First, if indeed similar preferences shared by family members, as demonstrated in Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2009) , are the primary factor driving stock ownership correlations, arguably family members should enter the market at similar stages of their life cycles. However, the sequential correlation we find implies that the entry of one family member will positively affect the entry decision of another member at a very different stage of the life cycle. 5 Second, our analysis explicitly takes into account the time needed for knowledge and information regarding stock investment to be accumulated, shared, and disseminated. One's stock market entry is unlikely to instantaneously affect family members' investment decisions.
Specifically, consider two individuals, A and B, who belong to the same family. Neither A nor B owns any stocks at time t. Suppose that A subsequently enters the stock market sometime between time t and t + τ for exogenous reasons. If the knowledge and information barriers preventing an investor from owning stocks can be overcome with the help of information shared by other family members, we should expect the likelihood that B enters the stock market after t + τ to be higher, with other factors held constant. The only identification assumption required is that the factors influencing A's investment decisions between times t and t + τ are not correlated with B's decisions made after t + τ. Because in our empirical analysis t and t + τ are separated by as many as five years, we argue that this assumption is a rather innocuous one.
How do we further establish that the sequential correlation of stock market entries within a family is due to information sharing instead of some herding behavior? The distinction between the two hypotheses is that if information sharing is the dominant force, investor B makes an informed decision to enter the stock market based on the know-how learned from investor A. In contrast, if herding behavior dominates, then investor B's entry does not necessarily reflect his or her increased knowledge and better information about stock investment. Investor B's entry (or exit) mainly reflects that his or her private information was dominated by the observation of A's entry (or exit).
Suppose entering the stock market for the first time requires accumulating new knowledge and information related to stock investment but exiting from the market does not require accumulating additional knowledge. Under this assumption, contrasting the sequential correlations of stock market entries and exits among family members will shed light on the relevance of the information-sharing effect versus the herding effect. Specifically, if we observe sequential correlations among family members in both entries and exits, it is plausible that the correlations are due to herding effects. In contrast, if we observe such correlations only in the context of stock market entries but not exits, they are more likely due to information sharing. Indeed, for exits, we do not find sequential correlations similar to what we find for entries, suggesting that the sequential stock market entries most likely reveal the effects of information sharing rather than herding.
III. Data
Like most of the previous studies of intergenerational correlations, this paper uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationwide longitudinal household survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan annually from 1968 to 1997 and biennially after 1997. The unique feature of the PSID is that it surveys not only the households originally included in the sample stratified in the late 1960s but also the split-out households formed by grown-up children from the original households and households formed by spouses who subsequently separated. Consequently, the sample size of the PSID has risen since its first wave. In the 2009 wave of the PSID data, the most recent release, almost 8,700 households were surveyed.
A. Extended Families
We focused on the effects of information potentially shared by an investor's parents, children, and siblings. In principle, the PSID also allowed us to study information sharing between grandparents and grandchildren. We did not pursue this relationship because the sample size was uncomfortably small. 6 The primary source for identifying each of these family relationships is the PSID parent identification file. We restrict the parent-child relationship to birth mother and birth father. 7 The mother and father of a child needed to be identified separately because they may no longer belong to the same household if they divorced. The sibling, including halfsibling, relationship was identified among the children who had the same birth mother or birth father. Throughout the entire sample construction, we restricted the sample individuals to those who had been either a household head or a head's wife in at least one of the waves when information on stock market participation was collected by the PSID. We then associated each of these people with the personal identifiers of their mothers, fathers, children, and siblings whenever applicable. Again, for such associations to be made, those family members must have been either the head or the wife of the head of their own households.
Upon completion of the associations establishing family relationships, our sample contained more than 15,320 individuals who belonged to more than 2,500 extended families. As summarized in table 1, the family structures contained in the PSID data are quite rich and extensive. For example, 60% of the individuals in our sample can be associated with their birth mothers, and 43% can be associated with their birth fathers. 8 Meanwhile, 48% of the individuals in our sample can be associated with their first grown-up child, about 29% can be associated with their second grown-up child, and so on. Finally, more than 50% of the sample individuals can be associated with at least one of their adult siblings, about 34% with at least two, and so on. 9
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B. Stock Ownership Data in the PSID
In addition to extensive income, employment, and demographic information that has been collected regularly, the PSID gathers information about household wealth holdings. A wealth module was included in the survey every five years between 1984 and 1999 and was included in every wave after 1999. Thus, the PSID collected stock ownership information in nine waves-1984, 1989, 1994 , and every other year since 1999-covering 25 years. 10 The unique combination of wealth data and rich intergenerational structure make the PSID an ideal data source for studying the correlations of stock ownership within families.
That said, two data limitations should be addressed. First, the stock ownership information in the PSID was collected only infrequently (every five years) before 1999. Nevertheless, we argue that this limitation is not extremely restrictive with respect to our research question because in our research design, it is important to allow a sufficient amount of time for knowledge and information to be accumulated and shared. Accordingly, in our baseline analysis, we focused on the correlation of sequential stock market entries among family members over two adjacent relatively long time intervals, typically of five years. For example, we will study how an individual's family members' stock market entries between 1989 and 1994 influenced the likelihood of this individual's own entry between 1994 and 1999.
The second data limitation is that the survey question in the PSID regarding stock ownership changed in 1999, making it difficult to observe stock market entries and exits in a consistent and accurate way. Prior to 1999, the PSID asked whether the household held any stocks either directly or indirectly through mutual funds, investment trusts, or individual retirement accounts (IRA). Starting with the 1999 survey, household stock ownership was defined to exclude stocks held in employer-based pensions or IRAs, and the survey separately asked whether the household had annuities or IRAs. 11 To validate the accuracy of the PSID stock ownership information and assess the discrepancy caused by the definitional change introduced in 1999, we present weighted statistics in table 2 for each of the nine waves and contrast them with the statistics calculated using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a nationwide representative cross-sectional survey of household wealth and finances conducted by the Federal Reserve Board and is widely believed to be the best source of information about household finances in the United States. Because it collects detailed information about various forms of stock holdings, we can benchmark the PSID statistics before and after the definitional change regarding stock holdings. 12 Because the SCF is a triennial survey that was not always in the field during the same year when the PSID data were collected, we linearly interpolated the SCF statistics to match the PSID year. 13 As table 2 shows, the PSID stock ownership statistics track their SCF counterparts very well, with all between-survey discrepancies smaller than 2 percentage points. For example, in 1989, the broadly defined PSID stock ownership was 30.6%, and its SCF counterpart was 31.8%; in 2005, the narrowly defined PSID stock ownership was 26.6%, and its SCF counterpart was 28.6%. Also seen in table 2, however, is that the definitional change caused an appreciable (and artificial) Moreover, earlier studies have shown that stock ownership via retirement accounts is different across cohorts and age groups, implying that the discrepancies in stock ownership in the PSID data calculated using the two definitions can be different across certain subpopulations. For example, the 1999 "Equity Ownership in America" report released jointly by the Investment Company Institute and the Security Industry Association documents a profound change in venues of first equity purchase (entering the stock market) across generation. 14 Among the GI generation (born between 1901 and 1924) , only 7% of the first equity purchases were through employer-sponsored retirement plans. The share rose substantially and consistently across subsequent cohorts and for generation X (born in the 1960s and 1970s): more than 50% of first equity purchases were through employer-sponsored retirement plans. The SCF data exhibit a pattern broadly consistent with this report. 15 As shown in figure 1 , the gaps between stock ownership are much wider for people younger than 45 than those older than 65.
C. Stock Market Entry and Exit
Our baseline analysis focuses on sequential correlations of stock market entries across relatively long time intervals among different members of the same family. Because the PSID wealth data were collected every five years between 1984 and 1999, it is convenient to examine correlations of stock ownership changes within three adjacent five-year intervals (1984-1989, 1989-1994, and 1994-1999) . The wealth data were collected every other year instead of every five years after 1999, making it impossible to create exact five-year intervals. To make use of the recent PSID data to their full extent, we construct intervals of similar length using data collected between 1999 and 2009. Specifically Table 3 presents the share of households by changes in their stock ownership status during a given time interval defined above. For example, between 1984 and 1989, 13.3% of households reported they did not own stocks in 1984 but did own stocks in 1989, and 8.7% owned stocks in 1984 but no longer in 1989. Finally, 20.3% (57.7%) of households reported that they owned stocks in both (neither) 1984 and 1989. As shown in the table, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, more households entered than exited from the stock market by a significant margin. Because of the definitional change, the entry statistic between 1994 and 1999 is downward biased, whereas the exit statistic is upward biased. From 1999 to 2005, about the same percentage of households entered and exited from the stock market under the more narrowly defined stock ownership, whereas toward the end of our sample period, between 2003 and 2009, 11.4% of households exited from the market and only 8.7% entered the market, likely reflecting financial crisis effects on stock ownership.
To further examine the effects of the definitional change of stock ownership on identifying households that entered the stock market in a given period, we present the share of households entering the stock market by age. Consistent with figure 1, we find that the definitional change has the largest 16 All results are qualitatively preserved when we exclude the last (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) pair of time intervals from our sample. 1984-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999 1999-2005 2003-2009 impact on the entry statistics of younger households. Between 1989 and 1994, under the broader stock ownership definition, 18.2% of households younger than age 45 entered the stock market. This share declined by more than 8 percentage points to below 10% during the five-year period ending in 1999, when the ownership was more narrowly defined. In contrast, the share of households entering the stock market for other age groups in the same period lowered to a much lesser degree. For households older than age 65, for example, the share declined from only 8. 3% (1989-1994) to 6.5% (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . 17 We construct a data set for the econometric analysis in the next section. As discussed before, we allow a sufficient amount of time for knowledge and information to be accumulated and shared among family members and accordingly focus on stock ownership changes over relatively long time intervals in our baseline specifications. The only additional sample restriction we impose is to keep only the households whose heads were at least 25 years old. 18 First, we defined a dummy variable entry i t, t+τ = 1 if the investor i's household had entered the stock markets between t and t+τ, and 0 otherwise, where the pair t, t+τ corresponds to each of the four intervals: 1989-1994, 1994-1999, 1999-2005, and 2003-2009 . Similarly, we defined three dummy variables: entry i, p t−τ , t , indicating if either investor i's father's household or mother's household had entered the stock markets; 19 entry i, c t−τ , t , indicating if at least one of investor i's children's households had entered the stock markets; and entry i, s t−τ , t , indicating if at least one of investor i's siblings' households had entered the stock markets. All three dummies refer to entries between t − τ and t, which correspond to each of the four intervals: 1984-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999, and 1999-2003 . Dummies of exit from the stock market are similarly defined.
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The top panel of table 4 presents summary statistics of the sample that pools all time intervals on stock market entry and 17 Separately, between 2003 and 2009, while the share of households entering the stock market rebounded noticeably for older households, it declined further to below 8% for households younger than 45.
18 Unlike many studies using the PSID data that focus on prime-age households (typically between ages 25 and 65), we do not impose maximum age restrictions because we were particularly interested in exploring the extent to which parents' investment is influenced by their children. Conceivably, parents are likely to be older than 65 when their children are able to make independent investment decisions. 19 This specification is relevant if mother and father were divorced. 1989-1994, 1994-1999, 1999-2005, and 2003-2009. (t − τ , t) corresponds to time intervals 1984-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999, and 1999-2003. Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
exit of the investors and of their extended family members in a lagged time period. More than 10% of our sample households entered the stock market. Nearly 6% of our sample households saw their parents enter the stock market in the previous five years. The percentages are even higher-7.9% and 10.2%, respectively-for their children and siblings entering the stock markets in the past five years. Nearly 12% of our sample households exited the stock market between t and t + τ. The percentages of the sample households whose parents, children, and siblings exited the stock market in the previous five years are 6.2%, 5.7%, and 8.1%, respectively. The lower panel of the table presents statistics of sample demographic characteristics. The average household head age in our sample is 47; 82% of the sample households are white; 60% are married; 15% are households headed by a single male; and roughly one-quarter of our sample households belong to each of the four educational attainment categories. 20 [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] , [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , and [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] ; shorter intervals refer to sequential pairs of intervals [1999] [2000] [2001] [2001] [2002] [2003] , [2001] [2002] [2003] [2003] [2004] [2005] , [2003] [2004] [2005] [2005] [2006] [2007] , and [2005] [2006] [2007] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Retired households are the omitted group of income quartiles. Households headed by a single female are the omitted group with respect to marital status and head gender dummies.
We implement additional analyses to address the two data limitations of infrequent stock ownership data collection prior to 1999 and stock ownership definitional change in 1999. First, we construct a sample similar to the one in our baseline analysis but focusing on stock ownership changes over two years. This sample covers the period from 1999 to 2009. There are two advantages of using this sample. First, it allows us to examine the effects of information sharing over a shorter period of time. Second, we experiment with counting both households owning stocks and households owning IRAs as stock owners in waves after 1999. 21 This alternative definition is likely to overstate stock ownership after 1999 because not all households owning IRAs have stocks held in their IRA portfolios. Indeed, the SCF data show that counting all IRA owners as stock owners will overstate stock ownership by about 5 percentage points. The idea is to examine whether our baseline results are qualitatively altered by stock ownership definitional change.
IV. Logistic Analysis
We estimated the following logistic model:
21 Data on IRA ownership were added to the PSID in 1999, the same wave of stock ownership definitional change.
where 1() is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the value of the Ψ function is greater than 0. The Ψ function is defined as
where τ = 5 or 6 τ = 4 or 5, depending on t, in our sample. In equation (2), Z is a vector of the investor's demographic and economic characteristics, whereas Wave t is a vector of survey wave dummies to capture the aggregate trend in stock market participation as well as wave-specific measurement errors caused by the 1999 change in the stock holding definition. We follow Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and let the vector of control variables, Z, include investors' educational attainment and labor income quartiles (with the retired households, which typically have no or very low labor income, being the omitted group) in addition to the standard demographic characteristics, such as an age polynomial, race, a married household dummy, and a dummy for households being headed by a single male. 22 Income quartiles are defined within each wave separately. Columns 1 to 3 of table 5 report the results of our baseline analysis, with standard errors and implied odds ratios shown in parentheses and brackets, respectively. Because we are interested in entrance into the stock market in this regression, the model was estimated after restricting the sample to investors who did not own any stocks in wave t. We first note that most of the control variables are tightly estimated and are consistent with both our expectations and previous studies. The estimated coefficients suggest that, for example, better-educated households and households with higher labor income are more likely to enter the stock market. However, marital status and the gender of head of single households do not appear to have a significant effect on stock market entries with a five-year interval. Now we focus on the coefficients of our key interests: family members' lagged stock market entries. The estimate of the entry i, p coefficient is about 0.3 and highly significant, while the estimate of the entry i, c coefficient is somewhat smaller (0.21) and has a borderline statistical significance at the 90% level. Previous studies on intergenerational correlations of income and wealth focus on the influence of parents on children (for example, Solon, 1992, and Hurst, 2003) . Interestingly, our results suggest that information provided by children potentially have influenced the investment decisions of their parents, and such influences are economically significant. The odds ratios implied by the estimated coefficients of entry i, p and entry i, c suggest that if the investor's parents or children had entered the stock market in the previous five years, this investor's own likelihood of investing in stocks in the subsequent five or six years would be 20% to 30% higher than that of a comparable investor who did not have the advantage of sharing information with other family members. In our sample, slightly more than 15% of households first entered the stock market during a five-year period. Thus, the contribution information sharing to the likelihood of entering the stock market is about 3 to 5 percentage points, largely consistent with BISW's estimates derived from administrative data.
Notwithstanding the pronounced effects of information sharing among parents and children, our baseline results do not provide strong evidence of similar effects among siblings. Although the point estimate of the coefficient of entry i, s is positive, it is too imprecisely estimated and is much smaller in magnitude (0.03) than those for entry i, p and entry i, c (0.30 and 0.21, respectively) . This result is somewhat surprising. Indeed, no previous study shows that information sharing among siblings is less frequent or less intense than that among parents and children. Moreover, given that siblings are typically at similar life cycle stages, one might expect that the peer effect would make information sharing among siblings more effective. For example, Lusardi (2003) shows that people learn from their older siblings about retirement planning.
Columns 4 through 6 of the table present results for the shorter (two-year) time intervals (1999-2001, 2001-2003, 2003-2005, 2005-2007, 2007-2009) . The definition of stock ownership was unchanged during these periods, requiring the investor to own stocks outside an IRA. This sample also helps us understand the effects of information sharing over shorter periods of time. We find that the estimated coefficients of both entry i, p and entry i, c remain statistically and economically significant at a 90% level or better. In addition, the coefficient of entry i, s , measuring the influence of siblings' previous stock market entries, remains small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
To assess the possible effects of the definitional change, we define stock owners as those who either own stocks outside IRAs or own IRAs (regardless of whether they hold stocks in the IRA portfolio) after 1999 and reestimate the model using the two-year intervals. The results are presented in columns 7 through 9. The estimated entry i, p coefficient is little changed at 0.27 and is statistically significant. Notably, the entry i, c coefficient is now much larger (0.48) and highly significant, potentially indicating that the effects of the definitional change of stock ownership vary across investors of different ages. Finally, the entry i, s coefficient remains small in magnitude and statistically insignificant under the alternative definition of stock ownership.
We next examine whether previous decisions to exit from the stock market made by an investor's family members also make this investor more likely to exit from the stock market in the ensuing years. As shown in table 6, regardless of whether we use the entire PSID sample with longer intervals (columns 1-3) or use shorter intervals defined after 1999 (columns 4-6), none of the estimated coefficients of exit i, p , exit i, c , and exit i, s are positive and statistically significant. These estimated coefficients are either relatively small positive numbers that are statistically insignificant or outright negative numbers. The only somewhat puzzling exception is that when we broaden the stock ownership definition to include IRAs, the estimated coefficient of exit i, s is positive (0.19) and statistically significant (column 7). On balance, we deduce from this finding that the positive correlation we found for stock market entry is evidence of the importance of information sharing rather than of an alternative hypothesis of herd behavior. That is, if the correlation in entry to the stock market reflected herd behavior, we would expect to see a similar pattern in exiting from the stock market. By contrast, assuming no new information is needed to exit the stock market, the largely absent correlation in exits is consistent with the information-sharing model.
Finally, we present the results of concurrent correlations of stock market entries and exits that occurred during the same time interval among family members. As we discussed earlier, concurrent correlations of entries and exits do not exclusively speak to the information-sharing effect because it is very difficult to rule out alternatively explanations for concurrent correlations. For example, members of the same family may enter the stock market together within a short period of time because of the favorable market conditions prevailing at that moment. By contrast, studying sequential stock market entries over adjacent time intervals plays a pivotal role in circumventing such identification difficulties and helps to take on even the information-sharing activities that need quite a long time before having an effect.
That said, focusing on time intervals that are as long as several years potentially leads us to overlook some of the information-sharing effects that occur more quickly. For example, we cannot rule out that part of the reason that the Pseudo R 2 = 0.076 *, **, *** indicate the coefficient estimated is statistically significant at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Longer intervals refer to sequential pairs of intervals [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] , [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , and [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] ; shorter intervals refer to sequential pairs of intervals [1999] [2000] [2001] [2001] [2002] [2003] , [2001] [2002] [2003] [2003] [2004] [2005] , [2003] [2004] [2005] [2005] [2006] [2007] , and [2005] [2006] [2007] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Retired households are the omitted group of income quartiles. Households headed by a single female are the omitted group with respect to marital status and head gender dummies. *, **, *** indicate the coefficient estimated is statistically significant at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Because we study concurrent correlations, we do not construct sequential pairs of time intervals. Thus, longer intervals correspond to 1984-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999, 1999-2005, and 2003-2009; shorter intervals refer to 1999-2001, 2001-2003, 2003-2005, 2005-2007, and 2007-2009 . Retired households are the omitted group of income quartiles. Households headed by a single female are the omitted group with respect to marital status and head gender dummies.
coefficients of entry i, s in most equations are not precisely estimated is that information sharing between siblings is very active and takes place within a shorter period of time than our data can demonstrate. 23 In this regard, concurrent correlations may shed additional light on the information-sharing effect.
Accordingly, we estimate a modified equation (2) with family members' lagged stock market entries (exits) being replaced with entries (exits) during the same time intervals and present the key parameters in table 7. As the results demonstrate, parents' and children's stock market entries are indeed concurrently correlated within the same five-year intervals. The correlations become more pronounced and 23 If a younger brother entered the stock market six months after an older brother with the help of the information they shared, such a pair of sibling entries does not manifest the information-sharing effect in our sample. statistically significant when we focus on entries occurring in the same two-year intervals defined over the latter part of the PSID sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . Notably, siblings' entries are also concurrently correlated, and the correlation is statistically significant. In addition, we do not see coherent evidence that stock market exits are correlated among family members, even in the concurrent context. 24
V. Conclusion
Social interaction is one of the most important channels through which households acquire knowledge and information about investment. The revolutionary progress
